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The Orange Revolution unveiled significant political and economic tensions between 
ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine. Whether this divide was caused by purely 
ethnic differences or by ethnically segregated reform preferences is unknown. Analysis 
using unique micro data collected prior to the revolution finds that voting preferences for 
the forces of the forthcoming Orange Revolution were strongly driven by preferences for 
political and economic reforms, but were also independently significantly affected by 
ethnicity; namely language and nationality. Russian speakers, as opposed to Ukrainian 
speakers, were significantly less likely to vote for the Orange Revolution, and nationality 
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1. Introduction  
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine
1 unveiled a significant voting divide between ethnic 
Ukrainians, who typically supported the reformist “Orange” opposition, and ethnic 
Russians, who usually were in favor of the more conservative pro-Russian wing of the 
political spectrum. While this political cleavage was evident on the surface, it is not 
properly understood whether it was genuinely driven by ethnicity or caused by other 
factors like different reform intentions between the ethnic groups.  
  For example, geographical proximity to Russia and the resulting social and 
economic ties could have led people living in the eastern parts of Ukraine to support pro-
Russian forces. Because ethnic Russians are concentrated in the eastern parts of Ukraine, 
the overall impression could have been that it was ethnicity rather then geographical 
distribution that was driving political preferences and unrest. Similarly, individual 
preferences for political and economic reforms clustered along ethnicity lines could have 
misled observers to conclude that it was ethnicity and not reform preferences that drove 
the Russian-Ukrainian political divide. 
However, there is empirical evidence that predicts the existence of a significant 
ethnicity-related political divide. As we have shown elsewhere (Constant, Kahanec, and 
Zimmermann, 2006), there has been a rising ethnicity-related earnings divide in favor of 
ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s transformation period. Consequently, there has been an 
increasing potential for an ethnicity-based political divide with a tendency to foster 
political groups that might be able to reverse this trend. We, therefore, expect to find 
strong and stable ethnicity-based preferences for the reform process linked to the Orange 
Revolution independent of the individual preferences for democracy and a market-
oriented system.     
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According to the literature on voting behavior in the tradition of Lipset (1963), 
ethnic division often turns elections into a referendum, where the relative sizes of ethnic 
groups consistently drive election results. An alternative view is that voting behavior is 
driven by perceptions about personal gains or losses inflicted upon the particular 
individuals or groups by the possible election results. In this vein, Brainerd (1998), who 
studies support for transformation in Russia, finds that predicted wage losses had little 
impact on voting behavior in the 1993 elections. Similarly, Fidrmuc (2000) studying the 
support for reforms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia reveals a 
number of distinct voting patterns that are driven by individual characteristics and career 
prospects. That individual prospects play an important role in determining voting 
behavior is corroborated by Kapstein and Milanovic (2000), who find that younger, better 
educated, and richer individuals supported Yeltsin in the 1996 Russian elections.  
Several researchers have analyzed the political processes driving the Orange 
Revolution. Arel (2005) stresses the geographical polarization of election results. 
Oksamytna and Khmelko (2006) and Khmelko (2006) discuss the effects of age, gender, 
education, geographical location, language, ethnic self-identification, and other factors on 
aggregate election results during the Orange Revolution. To our knowledge, however, 
there is no study that analyzes and quantifies these effects in a microeconometric 
framework.  
  This paper investigates whether one can trace a stable independent ethnicity factor 
that can help to explain the turbulent election results of 2004-2005. We are also interested 
in the potential role that different measures of ethnicity, such as language and nationality, 
may have in driving the political watershed and the seriously diverging voting 
preferences. In particular, we are interested in whether these two salient measures of 
ethnicity have independent effects on the voting behavior of the people of Ukraine.   
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To investigate the role of language and nationality in shaping the propensity to 
vote for the reformist political parties prior to the Orange Revolution, we use micro data 
from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS). In the first step, we 
evaluate the effects of these two measures of ethnicity on the likelihood to prefer the pro-
Orange parties. In the second step, we relax the assumption that voting preferences of 
different ethnic groups are determined by the same processes, except for a possible ethnic 
shift factor in the likelihood to vote for pro-Orange parties. In particular, we permit 
variation in the effects of different factors on the voting preferences of different ethnic 
groups using a new decomposition method.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes ethnic differences in Ukraine, 
and outlines the functioning of the political system. Section 3 presents the data used. 
Section 4 stages the voting preference model, and presents the empirical results. Section 
5 deals with the ethnic divide in voting preferences. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Ethnicity and Politics in Ukraine  
The ethnic identity of the inhabitants of the present-time Ukraine is a result of turbulent 
past developments. The two largest ethnicities, the Russians and Ukrainians, originate 
from the same ancient state of Kievan Rus.
2 After the fall of Kievan Rus, Russians and 
Ukrainians emerged as distinct ethnic groups over the centuries of foreign rulers, 
including the Russian Empire, Poland, the Cossack state, and Austro-Hungary, that 
governed large parts of the present-time Ukraine. Ukrainian identity developed in spite of 
Russification by Imperial Russia. After the Russian Revolution in 1917 and its brief 
independence
3 until 1922, Ukraine was incorporated into the USSR as the Ukrainian 
SSR. As a Soviet State, the Ukraine was stamped by Russian dominance in social,  
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economic, and political life.
 Yet the Ukrainian identity and language have survived and 
persisted. 
  Since August 1991 (with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the declaration of the 
Ukrainian independence), the Ukrainian language has been reinstated as the official 
language in Ukraine, and ethnic Ukrainians are the largest ethnic group in the new state. 
To wit, in the 2001 Ukrainian Census 67.5 percent of the country’s population named 
Ukrainian and 29.6 percent named Russian as their native language. With independence 
ethnic Ukrainians gained a platform for a better position in the Russian-Ukrainian ethnic 
relations in Ukraine. It must be also noted that the government in its nation-building 
effort has tried to curtail regionalism, and mitigate ethnic identity issues while pledging 
allegiance to territorial citizenship.
4   
  Nowadays, it is primarily language and nationality that distinguish ethnic 
Russians and Ukrainians. Russian and Ukrainian languages are similar but distinct. We 
take these two salient features of ethnicity as exogenous measures with respect to 
individual voting preferences.
5 
Concerning the political institutions, Ukraine is a semi-presidential representative 
democratic republic with a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the 
Cabinet, while legislative power is vested in the Parliament. Ukraine has a large number 
of political parties. Since some of these parties have minuscule electorates, they often 
form electoral coalitions for the purpose of participating in national elections.  
In the period preceding the Orange Revolution, political parties offered two main 
alternatives to the Ukrainian electorate. The main opposition parties, who would later 
become the key proponents of the Orange Revolution, aimed at disempowering the 
incumbent political elites in favor of more liberal policies and policies aiming at  
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Ukrainian integration in transatlantic structures. In contrast, the incumbent parties 
proposed more conservative policies and privileged relations with Russia. 
The Orange Revolution was a series of mass protests in Ukraine in response to 
allegations of electoral fraud in the 2004 presidential elections. The protests were fueled 
by a number of alleged cases of voter intimidation and the perception of massive 
corruption in Ukraine. Two key figures led the protests, Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia 
Timoshenko. They represented the alternative to the incumbent regime of Leonid 
Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovich.  
Nationalist sentiments during the Orange Revolution were ignited by alleged 
Russian and Western involvement in the events. Russian president Vladimir Putin did not 
conceal his political support to Viktor Yanukovich, while a number of western agencies 
provided material and logistical support to the revolutionary movement. These sentiments 
peaked when rumors that the Russian secret service was involved in the poisoning of 
Viktor Yushchenko prior to the revolution spread among protesters.  
The parties that orchestrated the Orange Revolution had several objectives that 
had some ethnic and/or nationalistic content and were generally considered to be 
ethnicity-wise pro-Ukrainian. Some of their most important political objectives were 
intensified economic and political relations with the West, including EU and NATO 
membership, elimination of Ukrainian economic and political dependence on Russia, and 
disempowerment of the largely pro-Russian oligarch structures. For example, Mr. 
Yushchenko often criticized the fact that the Russian Federation was involved way too 
much in the electoral campaign and appreciated the help of the West in counterbalancing 
Russia’s involvement. In contrast, Mr. Yanukovych regularly appealed to historical ties 
with Russia and extensively addressed the language issue, pledging to promote the 
Russian language to a second official state language. In addition, he supported the  
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discussion on the issue of the so-called South-Eastern Ukrainian Autonomous Republic 
in predominantly Russian areas.
6 
 
3. Data and Variables 
The Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) is a nationally representative 
micro-dataset and the primary source of information for this study.
7 It started in 2003 
covering 8,621 individuals from 4,056 households. Besides a number of standard 
demographic variables at the individual and household level, it also contains information 
on individual voting preferences. We use the 2003 data and the second wave carried out 
in 2004.  
We study ethnic groups as identified by self-reported nationality
8 and primary 
domestic language in the 2003 wave of the ULMS. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their nationality from the list including Ukrainian, Russian, Byelorussian, Jewish, or 
other nationality and their first domestic language from the list including Ukrainian, 
Russian, mixed Ukrainian and Russian, Byelorussian, Jewish, Polish, Hungarian, or 
other. The mix of Ukrainian and Russian languages is commonly called Surzhyk in 
Ukraine, and we will use this term somewhat vaguely to denote the language of those 
people that reported mixed Ukrainian and Russian as their primary domestic language.
9  
From the total of 8,621 individual observations for each of the years included in 
the survey we select those who were older than 18 in the survey year and thus eligible to 
vote at the time of the survey. Furthermore, we eliminate observations with missing data 
in key variables, including voting, economic and political preferences, gender, age, 
marital status, number of children, education and health, labor market status, and 
settlement size and region. These restrictions leave us with 4,925 observations in the 
baseline sample. Table 1 summarizes the frequencies of individuals by nationality and  
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language. From this table it is apparent that the numbers of people who identify 
themselves as Russian and speak Ukrainian or Surzhyk as their first domestic language 
are relatively small, totaling 79 observations. Table 1 reveals that ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians are represented in our sample fairly proportionally, as compared to their 
respective shares in the Ukrainian population documented by the 2001 Census.
10  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In Table 2 we report mean values of various important variables for the four 
largest ethnic groups in Ukraine, namely preferences for the political change, preferences 
for the political and economic system, various religious denominations, age and 
educational attainment. Individual voting preferences in 2003 and 2004 are elicited in the 
ULMS by the question what party would the respondent vote for, if the parliamentary 
elections were held the coming Sunday. To capture the people’s voting preferences with 
regard to the upcoming political polarization, we generated a binary variable “pro-
Orange” that takes the value of one if a person would vote for the election blocs of the 
protagonists of the Orange Revolution and zero otherwise. The voting divide shows up 
immediately in the first row. While about 54 percent of Ukrainian speakers with 
Ukrainian nationality prefer pro-Orange parties, less than 11 percent of Russian speakers 
with Russian nationality do so. Generally, the pattern of voting preferences is consistent 
with the notion that the “less Russian” the group is, the larger is the share of its members 
who prefer pro-Orange parties.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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We further have valuable information on the individual preferences towards the 
political and economic system. Concerning political preferences, respondents were asked 
what kind of political system the person would like his or her children to live under, with 
the possible answers ranging from a pre-perestroika Soviet system to a Western-type 
democracy. Economic preferences were elicited similarly. Respondents had the choice of 
answers ranging between a pre-perestroika central planning to a free market economy 
without governmental regulation. To illustrate this divide, we have assigned points to the 
various answers. On political preferences we gave points from one to four and on 
economic preferences points from one to six; the scale is ascending with a more pro-
Western response. Afterwards, we calculated the average scores for each ethnic group. 
We observe that while the differences are not as conspicuous as in the case of voting 
preferences, they are quite considerable. Surzhyk speakers of Ukrainian nationality are 
the most conservative ethnic group in both economic and political preferences. At the 
other end of the spectrum lie the Ukrainian speakers of Ukrainian nationality. Russian 
speakers of Russian nationality are the second most conservative ethnic group, while 
those Russian speakers that have Ukrainian nationality are notably less conservative.  
Turning to religious affiliations and other characteristics, Table 2 shows that for 
the most part the more “Western” the religion is, the lesser the proportion of people with 
stronger Russian ethnicity that adhere to it is. For example, as measured by proportions in 
respective ethnic groups, followers of the Russian Orthodox Church come mostly from 
the group of Russian speakers who have Russian nationality and to a lesser degree from 
those Russian speakers who have Ukrainian nationality. Surzhyk speakers are 
considerably less likely and Ukrainian speakers are the least likely to be followers of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Similarly, Catholic and Greek Catholic denominations are 
virtually confined to Ukrainian speakers with Ukrainian nationality.   
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While ethnic groups differ in terms of age and education as well, this difference is 
somewhat less marked. Still, it is interesting that Russian nationals who speak Russian 
are, on average, the oldest group (almost 51 years old) and educational attainment of 
Surzhyk speakers is relatively substandard. Finally, as shown in Table 3, ethnic groups 
are dispersed fairly unevenly across the Ukrainian regions (oblast). In particular, the 
southern and eastern regions of Ukraine exhibit overrepresentation of people of Russian 
nationality or Russian language. In contrast, the central, northern, and western regions are 
mainly populated by people of Ukrainian ethnicity.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Estimation Framework and Results 
Voting preferences are shaped by individual attitudes towards the values that different 
parties represent as well as individual characteristics such as age, gender, and political 
and economic preferences that drive these attitudes. Whether ethnicity directly drives 
differentials in voting preferences or these are mainly driven by other characteristics that 
vary across ethnic groups, such as political or economic preferences, religious affiliation, 
or other individual characteristics, is the key issue investigated in this section.  
  We employ an econometric framework to assess the role of ethnicity, that is, 
language and nationality, in driving voting preferences. Given the binary choice character 
of voting preferences in the context of the Orange Revolution, the binary probit model is 
a natural starting point of such analysis. To isolate the effects of ethnicity on voting 
preferences from those of other demographic, social, and economic variables, we control 
for these other variables in the regressions. Given the uneven distribution of ethnicities 
across Ukraine, particularly important is controlling for regional dummies, since these  
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may capture social and economic ties to Russia and the West that may be driven by 
geographic proximity to the respective societies. Namely, we estimate the following 
model depicting the probability of pro-Orange voting preferences: 
 
() ( ) X Orange P β′ Φ = =1          (1) 
 
where  Φ is the standard normal distribution of voting preferences and X is a vector of 
variables driving these preferences. The independent variables of particular interest in X 
are the two measures of ethnicity, nationality and language, and the two sets of variables 
covering reform preferences, economic and political. As reference categories we use the 
Ukrainian language, Ukrainian nationality, and pre-perestroika economic and political 
systems.  
  In Table 4 we present the regression results of the probit model. Column 1 is the 
baseline model, with ethnicity as the main determinant of pro-Orange choice and 
additional controls for age, gender, and the year 2004. The year dummy captures other 
general factors happening in that year. Columns 2 to 4 contain the results of augmented 
estimations as we control for a number of additional individual social, economic, and 
demographic characteristics that have an impact on the probability to vote pro-Orange. 
These include political and economic preferences, religion, number of children, marital 
status, whether a person has self-reported health problems, settlement size dummies 
(village, urban settlement, small town up to 20,000 inhabitants, medium town with 20-
99,000 inhabitants, city with 100-500,000 inhabitants, and large city with more than 
500,000 inhabitants), geographic region (oblast), highest attained educational level, 
employment status (employee, entrepreneur, farmer, family helper), and a range of non- 
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employment status variables (including unemployed, retiree, student, disabled, and 
maternity leave).  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Column 1 reveals that both nationality and language have significant negative 
effects on voting preferences. This finding suggests that the Russian-Ukrainian voting 
divide is a phenomenon that has a substantial ethnic component. In particular, the 
coefficient of Russian nationality is significantly negative, meaning that people of 
Russian nationality are less likely to vote pro-Orange than the benchmark group of 
Ukrainian speakers with Ukrainian nationality. The coefficients of Russian and Surzhyk 
language are also significantly negative, verifying the ethnic divide. But are these 
findings sufficiently stable if more control variables are included into the model? 
The rest of the columns in Table 4 verify that the findings are fairly stable. The 
negative impact of Russian nationality on the likelihood to vote pro-Orange remains 
about the same size. The negative effect of speaking the Russian language is somewhat 
decreasing in absolute value with the inclusion of demographic and labor market 
variables in column 3 and regional variables in column 4, but remains highly significant. 
While the coefficient of Surzhyk language is still negative in column 3, as we control for 
regional and settlement size dummies this variable loses significance, indicating that the 
correlation between Surzhyk language and voting preferences is explained by the 
regional distribution of linguistic groups. These findings imply that it is being of Russian 
nationality or speaking Russian that negatively affects pro-Orange voting relative to 
Ukrainian speakers of Ukrainian nationality.   
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Further, Table 4 explores the contribution of revealed preferences concerning the 
political and economic systems to the pro-Orange voting behavior. We have covered the 
indicators of these preferences by two sets of dummy variables: (i) for the options for the 
political system preferences we have: reformed Soviet system, current system, Western-
type democracy, and other systems, with the pre-perestroika Soviet system as the 
reference case, and (ii) for the economic system preferences, we have the options of 
reformed centrally planned system, current system, strongly regulated market system, 
weakly regulated market system, free market economy, and other systems, with the pre-
perestroika centrally-planed economy as the reference case. Our estimates confirm that 
more liberal and pro-Western political and economic preferences imply a higher 
likelihood that an individual votes pro-Orange. While the effects of political and 
economic preferences are partly explained by economic, social, and settlement and 
regional control variables, (see columns 3 and 4), the fairly stable and highly significant 
parameter estimates across the estimated models confirm the strong role of the economic 
and political preferences on voting preferences.  
Hence, the pro-Orange voting preferences are significantly explained by both 
ethnicity and preferences for particular political and economic systems. What relative 
roles do both alternatives exhibit on the voting preferences? To answer this question, we 
treat the estimates in column 4 of Table 4 as the reference case with a Pseudo-R
2 of 
0.347. A reduced model excluding the ethnicity variables lead to a Pseudo-R
2 of 0.341 
and a likelihood-ratio test-statistic of 41.48 with 3 degrees of freedom. A reduced model 
excluding the variables measuring the preferences concerning the political and economic 
system lead to a Pseudo-R
2 of 0.306 and a likelihood-ratio test-statistic of 266.30 with 10 
degrees of freedom. From these results we confirm that both ethnicity and systems  
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preferences are important, although the latter are somewhat more relevant than the 
former.   
To understand the magnitude of the estimated ethnicity effects, we compute the 
marginal effects of changing Russian nationality and Russian language dummy variables 
from 0 to 1 on the probability of being pro-Orange. Taking the structural estimates from 
column 4, it turns out that speaking the Russian language decreases the likelihood of 
voting pro-Orange by 9.5 percentage points, as compared to being Ukrainian speaker; 
being of Russian nationality decreases this likelihood by 9.9 percentage points as 
compared to being of Ukrainian nationality.  
As concerns the control variables, we observe that age and gender do not have a 
significant independent effect on voting preferences. The effects of age vanish with the 
inclusion of demographic and labor market controls. It is interesting that the gender effect 
becomes significant with inclusion of political and economic preferences but loses its 
explanatory power as we control for demographic and labor market variables. Concerning 
the other control variables, several distinct patterns arise (coefficients not reported). 
Compared to the benchmark Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchy) 
denomination, people of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy) and 
Orthodox Church (with no partition) are significantly less likely to vote pro-Orange. On 
the other hand, people of the Greek Catholic denomination significantly more likely 
prefer pro-Orange parties than the benchmark group. These findings signify yet another 
component of ethnicity in voting preferences.  
Given that we control for economic and political preferences, marital status, 
number of children, education, and employment status do not seem to play any 
significant role in shaping voting preferences.
11 While employment status is for the most 
part insignificant, disabled people (and marginally also those that report general health  
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problems) show significant preferences against the Orange parties, perhaps because of 
their limited capacity to respond to the potential challenges inherent in the regime 
changes purported by the pro-Orange parties. Further, people in the military service are 
somewhat less likely to vote pro-Orange. Another distinct pattern is that people who live 
in the western regions of Ukraine are significantly more likely to vote pro-Orange. 
Finally, inhabitants of small and medium towns are significantly less likely to vote pro-
Orange than villagers and inhabitants of cities. 
 
5. Decomposition of the Voting Divide 
The technique of including ethnic dummy variables in a binary choice model is a very 
useful tool to measure the effects of ethnicity on voting preferences, but it assumes that 
different ethnic groups behave in a similar way, except for a shift factor driven by 
ethnicity. This assumption may be somewhat too restrictive, since for different ethnic 
groups different variables may have different effects. The most conspicuous is the 
example of the effects of region where the respondent lives. In particular, respondents of 
Russian ethnicity living in regions close to the Russian border may have, given the 
relatively intense economic and social ties to Russia, good incentives to vote against pro-
Orange parties in fear that these parties would restrain these ties. However, people with 
Ukrainian ethnicity in such regions may well respond quite differently: they might be 
concerned about the intense relations with Russia that often favor ethnic Russians and 
therefore vote for pro-Orange parties, hoping that they will curtail these, from their 
perspective unfavorable, relations with Russia. In particular, ethnic Ukrainians may, in 
contrast to ethnic Russians, perceive such ties to Russia as a threat to their social and 
economic interests.  
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For these reasons we consider a method that decomposes ethnic differentials in 
voting preferences as developed by Fairlie (1999, 2003, and 2005). This method 
computes the difference in the probability  ( ) 1 = Orange P  between different ethnic groups 
and quantifies the contribution of group differences in explanatory variables to the 
outcome differential. In particular, we apply the decomposition technique on the model 
specification corresponding to column 4 in Table 4; obviously, omitting the nationality 
and language indicators.  
The results are presented in Table 5. We observe that significant parts of the 
differentials in voting preferences between ethnic groups are explained by observable 
characteristics. Consistent with the results presented above, the “less Russian” the ethnic 
group is the higher is its propensity to indicate pro-Orange voting preferences. To 
illustrate, at one extreme, we can ascribe less than 1 percentage points of the voting 
differential between Surzhyk and Ukrainian speakers of Ukrainian nationality to their 
belonging to different linguistic groups. In contrast, more than 17 percentage points can 
be attributed to ethnic differences between Ukrainian speakers of Ukrainian nationality 
and Russian speakers of Russian nationality.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
While the Russian-Ukrainian political cleavage gained worldwide attention during the 
Orange Revolution, the role of the different dimensions of ethnicity on this divide has not 
been properly understood. Using rich information on voting preferences before the 
Orange Revolution this paper provides an understanding of the 2005 events. Reform 
preferences reported among individuals in 2003 and 2004 are shown to have had a strong  
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impact on the willingness to vote for the parties of the Orange Revolution. Undoubtedly, 
we also find that ethnic Russians were less likely to vote pro-Orange than ethnic 
Ukrainians just prior to the Orange Revolution and this is independent of their 
preferences for a western type market economy and a western type democracy.  
  What is a potential explanation for the independent effects of ethnicity? As we 
have established elsewhere (see Constant, Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2006), there was a 
rising ethnic economic divide in favor of ethnic Russians during Ukraine’s 
transformation in the years before the Orange Revolution that suggested a rising ethnic 
political divide. Ethnic Russians had probably the desire to preserve the incumbent elite 
in power in hopes to sustain the benefits and the profitable positions they enjoyed during 
the Soviet era or later. Ethnic Ukrainians had strong economic incentives for a political 
change. In fact, in our analysis here in this paper, we find that being of Russian 
nationality and/or speaking the Russian or Surzhyk language had a negative effect on 
voting for the pro-Orange parties in comparison to the Ukrainian ethnicity, which is in 
line with our hypothesis.  
  These findings confirm that language and nationality are distinct dimensions of 
ethnicity that exercised a catalytic role on the voting preferences and election outcomes 
in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. Their strength and relevance should not be 
underestimated. The Russian-Ukrainian earnings divide has a companion: the Russian-




1. The Orange Revolution was a defining moment in Ukraine’s recent history. It indicates 
the period from the late November 2004 to January 2005, where a series of protests and 
political events were in the daily forefront in Ukraine. The protests begun right after the 
2004 presidential election that was admittedly the result of direct electoral fraud. This 
period demonstrated an amazing active participation of Ukrainians in politics. The 
Orange Revolution came to a peaceful finale after the “fair and free” second run-off 
election. 
2. Also known as Kievan Ruthenia, it was an important state with Kiev as its capital and 
lasted from about 880 until the middle of the 12
th century. 
3. In two states, Ukrainian People’s Republic and West Ukrainian People’s Republic.  
4. Some researchers have even found that the Ukrainian electorate was on a de-polarizing 
path and close to national integration (Hesli, Reisinger, and Miller (1998)).  
5. Constant, Kahanec, and Zimmermann (2006) find that these two factors of ethnicity 
play a crucial role on the earnings divide between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians.  
6. See Salnykova (2006). 
7. For a more detailed description of the ULMS see Lehmann, Pignatti, and Wadsworth 
(2006), Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005), and Ganguli and Terrell (2006). 
8. Note that nationality (natsionalnost) in the Ukrainian context reflects social, ethnic, 
and/or cultural identity rather than citizenship. We use the term nationality accordingly. 
9. Out of Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian as their first language about 12 percent speak 
Russian as their second domestic language, 86 percent speak Russian, and all understand 
Russian. Out of Russians who speak Russian as their first language about 11 percent 
speak Ukrainian as their second domestic language, 46 percent speak Ukrainian, and 69 
percent understand Ukrainian.  
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10. According to the 2001 Ukrainian Census, of Ukrainians who report either Ukrainian 
or Russian nationality (95.1 percent of the total population) 81.8 percent report Ukrainian 
and 18.2 percent Russian nationality. In the same Census, 67.5 percent of the country 
population named Ukrainian as their native language (including Surzhyk speakers), while 
29.6 percent reported Russian language. 
11. Further estimations for a restricted sample of employed respondents (not reported 
here) show that inclusion of occupation and industry controls does not affect our results 
on the role of ethnicity for voting preferences.  
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Proportions of individuals by nationality and language 
   Language    
Nationality  Ukrainian  Surzhyk  Russian  Total 
Ukrainian   51.90%  12.02%  19.35%  83.27% 
Russian   0.69%  0.91%  15.13%  16.73% 
Total  52.59%  12.93%  34.48%  100% 























Table 2  
Selected descriptive statistics by nationality and language 
  












Share pro-Orange  0.543  0.257  0.211  0.106  0.375 
Preferred economic system  2.940  2.015  2.641  2.347  2.677 
Preferred political system  2.487  1.695  2.136  1.875  2.226 
Ukrainian Orthodox Kiev Patriarchy  0.396  0.422  0.296  0.153  0.342 
Ukrainian Orthodox Moscow Patriarchy 0.106  0.096  0.106  0.156  0.112 
Russian Orthodox  0.007  0.032  0.064  0.141  0.042 
Orthodox  0.101  0.147  0.139  0.164  0.124 
Catholic  0.128  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.069 
Greek Catholic  0.109  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.059 
Protestant  0.003  0.000  0.003  0.001  0.002 
Age  46.54  50.22  46.84  50.86  47.71 
Completed higher education  0.170  0.101  0.213  0.216  0.177 
Number of observations  2,556  592  953  745  4,846 
 
Note: Observations with the response “Other” were excluded from the calculations of the scores for preferred economic 















Table 3  
Geographical distribution by nationality and language 
  











Center  54.12%  19.50%  16.59%  9.80% 
North  63.26%  24.44%  8.15%  4.16% 
East  9.49%  12.43%  40.70%  37.38% 
Kyiv City  34.92%  1.59%  47.22%  16.27% 
South  36.31%  15.67%  24.74%  23.28% 
West  95.84%  0.64%  1.44%  2.08% 
 











Probabilities to Vote pro-Orange 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ethnicity             
Russian nationality  -0.351**  -0.330**  -0.309**  -0.278** 
   (0.070)  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.080) 
Surzhyk language  -0.732**  -0.465**  -0.374**  -0.020 
   (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.066)  (0.077) 
Russian language  -0.958**  -0.939**  -0.796**  -0.281** 
   (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.077) 
              
Age  -0.017**  -0.004**  -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Female  0.034  0.140**  0.085  0.091 
   (0.039)  (0.042)  (0.047)  (0.049) 
Year 2004  0.073  0.027  0.049  0.074 
   (0.039)  (0.042)  (0.053)  (0.056) 
Political preferences             
Reformed Soviet     0.368**  0.334**  0.307** 
      (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.078) 
Current system     0.776**  0.719**  0.708** 
      (0.110)  (0.112)  (0.120) 
Western-type democracy     1.006**  0.894**  0.706** 
      (0.080)  (0.083)  (0.088) 
Other     0.627**  0.455*  0.311 
      (0.194)  (0.198)  (0.223) 
Economic preferences             
Reformed centrally planned     0.190*  0.178*  0.102 
      (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.079) 
Current system     0.322*  0.297*  0.150 
      (0.137)  (0.142)  (0.150) 
   0.366**  0.336**  0.243**  Strongly regulated market 
   (0.083)  (0.084)  (0.090) 
   0.563**  0.496**  0.431**  Weakly regulated market 
   (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.101) 
Free market economy     0.610**  0.535**  0.431** 
      (0.104)  (0.106)  (0.113) 
Other     0.352  0.418  0.395 
      (0.298)  (0.311)  (0.347) 
         
Other Controls             
Education level        Yes  Yes 
Religion        Yes  Yes  
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Table 4 
Probabilities to Vote pro-Orange 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Children        Yes  Yes 
Marital status        Yes  Yes 
Health status        Yes  Yes 
Labor market status        Yes  Yes 
Settlement size           Yes 
Geographical region           Yes 
Constant  0.842**  -0.535**  -0.613**  -1.402** 
   (0.071)  (0.096)  (0.171)  (0.260) 
         
Pseudo R-squared  0.142  0.264  0.288  0.347 
Log likelihood  -2,795.1  -2,397.6  -2,319.0  -2,125.1 
Number of observations  4,925  4,925  4,925  4,925 
 
Note: Binary probit model with “1” = pro-Orange and “0” otherwise. The benchmark is a Ukrainian 
speaking male of Ukrainian nationality preferring a pre-perestroika Soviet-type political and centrally 
planned economic system. The benchmark year in 2003. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  














Decomposition results on the probability to vote pro-Orange 
Nationality     Ukrainian 
   Language     Ukrainian Surzhyk  Russian 
Ukrainian  Surzhyk  Difference  0.286       
      Explained  0.283       
      Unexplained  0.003       
   Russian  Difference  0.332  0.046    
      Explained  0.230  -0.017    
      Unexplained  0.102  0.063    
Russian  Russian  Difference  0.437  0.151  0.105 
      Explained  0.265  0.046  0.069 
      Unexplained  0.172  0.105  0.036 
 
Note: A positive number implies that the column group is more pro-Orange than the 
respective row group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 